The Officer as a Leader Part II

[wukong]

Interesting that CPT Sobel comes up here. Remember that many members of Easy company credit him with making the company such a great team by enforcing such high standards (and giving them all someone to hate). Even COL Sink, who knew something about leadership, said that Sobel was a great trainer.

It seems to me that a guy like Sobel would have loved SAC and its’ checklists. Us Army guys have always thought that AF leadership was too ‘checklist centric’, leading to a lack of imagination and therefore flexibility. But, some of the more colorful AF types seem to understand that. To quote the title character from another iconic WWII flyer’s movie: ‘Rules are for sergeants’ -CPT Buzz Rickson.

A lot of what Army and Marine Infantry types see or misunderstand is driven by the machine we fly. The machine can not think or adapt as one would expect from an Infantry soldier. The machine has to be fed instructions in a sequence and worst of all the machine will not cover any errors that are made by the operator.

Another difference seems to be one of perspective. From an Air Force view point it would appear as if ground forces plan going forward. Your take A, then B and then C. When flying in support of this scenario, air forces are given targets and all mission planning takes place in reverse order.

Also many of the rules we operate under are not fully understood as to how they originated or the impact they may have when violated. For example, I once read a critique by an Army SF type that was tasked along with a C-141 SOLL 2 crew to perform a real world mission. While the briefing/planning was occurring the C-141 Pilot brought up the fact that the mission would entail a violation of crew rest rules. The Army troop perceived the mention of crew rest as a wimpy response. However crew rest in the aviation business (especially commercial aviation) is as near sacrosanct as a rule can get. The pilot on his own has no authority to waver a crew rest rule. From an aviation standpoint the pilot was just warning the Com JTF that an AF General Officer would have to wavier the rules. It may appear to be inflexible, but crew rest rules are written in blood. A good deal of that blood is from the passenger compartment.

[PhilK]

It is just a culture difference. When I was a Cav Troop commander I had to take crew rest into consideration everytime we did mission planning. I have several buddies who are Army Aviators and trust me...I still gave them crap over it.

The view from the ground is, if my men and I are expected to conduct a mission with as little as 4 hours of sleep (per regulation) then we don't really "get" the whole 8 hour crew rest thing even in combat situations. (I understand the regs and I understand that you flying a plane is a little bit more complex then us moving to a objective and taking it by force...but still...operating under fatigue is just one of those things we are trained to do.)

[Javelin66]

I agree, and I know that it is really more than simply a safety issue. That won't stop me from poking fun at the 'zipper suited Sun gods'.

I think that I began to understand it when I became a jumpmaster. A lot of the procedures that I just sort of followed before became perfectly clear as I studied airborne operations in much more detail. Things are much more complex than you realize as a jumper, and all of the procedures are based on the cumulative practical experience of thousands of operations.

As I used to tell my guys, behind every 'stupid' rule is a true story...

Tim, I saw your question in the now-defunct 'Officer as a leader part I' thread. Keep in mind that the men aren't looking for you to be the toughest, smartest, etc. in the platoon (although that certainly helps). They want you to do your best, learn from your mistakes, and put them first, right after the mission. If you show them loyalty and respect, they will return it- of course, at first it's because they have to. A good way to start is to suffer every hardship and accept every risk that the men do.

Just about every officer position is paired with a senior NCO, who has an additional, unwritten task of training and mentoring that officer. The real challenge is when the time comes (and it always does) that you don't take his advice and pray that you made the right decision.

[wukong]

Tim, I saw your question in the now-defunct 'Officer as a leader part I' thread. Keep in mind that the men aren't looking for you to be the toughest, smartest, etc. in the platoon (although that certainly helps). They want you to do your best, learn from your mistakes, and put them first, right after the mission. If you show them loyalty and respect, they will return it- of course, at first it's because they have to. A good way to start is to suffer every hardship and accept every risk that the men do.

I would like to add that your subordinates will also recognize and respect what I will call moral courage. You may be the leader within your unit, but you have both responsibility and duty to your "leader." No one relishes being the bad guy or the one who has to say NO. When required to deliver "bad news" to your subordinates there is always that incentive to pass the blame upstairs. If you agree with the decision of the bad news and if you would have made the same decision as a superior, then you should accept the decision as your own. You have no obligation to answer the inevitable "why" question that will come from your whiners. Your professional soldiers will most likely accept your orders/instruction. With experience you will know when a "consensus" of your people may require you to disclose the level of a decision. If you operate on this rule with the minor affairs, you will gain respect on the larger affairs. Soldiers will eventually find out where orders/instruction originate. If you consistently pass the buck, you are hardly better than the whiners.

It is just a culture difference. When I was a Cav Troop commander I had to take crew rest into consideration everytime we did mission planning. I have several buddies who are Army Aviators and trust me...I still gave them crap over it.

I'm sure that your buddies recognized the irony of you a non aviator having to deal with the situation.

Aircrews are just like most everyone else across the services. Aircrews want to fly the mission to complete satisfaction and will take exceptional risk if granted that authority. Experience has repeatedly shown that crew rest decisions must be taken away from the crew and placed at a higher level of authority.

[Javelin66]

Great point; that is the first step towards trying to be everybody's pal. Eventually the day will come when you have to be the bad guy. That day is even harder if you have created artificial relationships.

[wukong]

I find the video series "Band of Brothers" to be a very valuable source of material dealing with leadership discussions. First because there is a great deal of historical accuracy and second most of us have some access to them.

In episode 6, The Breaking Point, First Sergeant Lipton expresses to Captain Winters, the Battalion Commander, that in his opinion Captain Dyke, Easy Company Commander, is an empty suit and will get "a lot of Easy's men killed." Lipton's thoughts are this is something he could never imagine himself doing as an enlisted soldier. This may have been the Army of WWII, but it is not the Army of today. This is true for all the services.

I once fired a Captain that worked for me for buying his men beer during the period they were servicing C-130's performing Engine Running Offloads. The person who informed me of what was transpiring was my senior E. I have also had to discipline the E's that worked for me and I would never so much as verbally reprimand an E without first consulting with my senior E. I can not image any punitive disciplinary action against an enlisted man in today's services without consultation and most probably on the advice of the units senior E.

I don't know when the services instituted the positions of Senior Enlisted Adviser but the Training Wing I was assigned to in 1971 had one at the Wing level as well as Squadron First Sergeants. The senior Es that post on the forum could bring some light to this discussion as well as their involvement with subordinate officers within their units.

[soccermark23]

I found this article discussing the history of First Sergeants in the USAF and thought it would be a good addition to wukong's last post.

First Shirts
By Bruce D. Callander

Their lineage goes back a long way, and they play a vital role in today’s Air Force.

Think of a military job that creates stiff personal demands, requires breaking with your primary career field, demands around-the-clock attention, and lasts only three years. Now note that the person holding this job is the first one to which a troubled airman turns when he or she needs serious help.

You begin to grasp the importance of USAF’s first sergeants—“first shirts,” in Air Force parlance. You also grasp why, with airmen deploying constantly and working at a very high operations tempo, the contribution of these top-level enlisted members is more important than ever.

In the Air Force, “first sergeant” is not a grade but a special duty designation. He or she reports directly to the unit commander on matters of enlisted morale, welfare, and conduct, and is the chief enlisted advisor to the commander on all of these factors.


The position normally is filled by noncommissioned officers with the permanent ranks of master sergeant, senior master sergeant, or chief master sergeant. They can be identified by the diamond device that they wear on the center of their rank insignia.

CMSgt. Sandra Miller, the first sergeant special duty manager for the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, who today is CMSAF Rodney J. McKinley, said senior NCOs should consider a tour as first sergeant “not only for their career and breadth of experience but for [the sake of] the Air Force.”

Specifically, the first shirt helps provide a commander with a mission-ready enlisted force and prepares enlisted personnel for deployments. He advises the commander on a wide range of topics including the health of his airmen and their esprit de corps, discipline, well-being, career progression, and professional development. The first sergeant works with fellow senior NCOs and supervisory personnel to ensure equitable discipline.

He ensures that supervisors set an appropriate example for subordinates and provides guidance. He oversees training in leadership, customs and courtesies, dress and personal appearance, self-discipline, adherence to standards, drill and ceremony, and safety. The first sergeant helps enlisted members adapt to the military environment and adjust to the organization and manages care and upkeep of unit dormitories and adjacent grounds. He coordinates with supervisors to schedule unit functions, duties, leaves, and passes.

The Search for Top-Notch NCOs
Equally important, a unit’s first sergeant works closely with the relevant command chief master sergeant—the senior enlisted advisor to the commander at the level of wing, numbered air force, and major command—to ensure airmen are prepared to execute their missions.

“In effect, the first sergeant is a facilitator,” said Miller.


First sergeants are selected through a combination of application and nomination. Once an NCO applies, the application goes through a wing command chief, to a wing commander, to a major command chief, and on to the Military Personnel Center. Sometimes, a nominee will not be released from his primary career field. Assuming the applicant is released, however, the NCO is scheduled to attend the First Sergeant Academy at Maxwell AFB, Ala.

It is highly unlikely that a nominee will wind up back at the unit from which he came. “Chances are, that the unit already has a first sergeant,” said Miller. “So that NCO is going to get trained and usually will go to another squadron.”

As a special duty assignment, the first sergeant job is in competition with a number of other special duty jobs, all of which are looking for top NCOs. A first sergeant is critical in a squadron. “That’s why it is so important to keep the jobs full,” said Miller.

Some NCOs are fearful that a tour as first sergeant will slow their advancement in their primary careers and delay promotions. The facts show this is not so. “I think any time you do a special duty,” said Miller, “any time you take on that extra responsibility, you become a better senior NCO.” She added that NCOs who have done a tour or more as a first sergeant are more likely to be promoted. The scope of experience gained as a first sergeant provides a boost.

A number of command chief master sergeants have, at one time, served as first sergeants. Moreover, McKinley, the current Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, served as first sergeant with four squadrons.

At last count, the Air Force had 1,190 first sergeants serving in assigned positions and was looking for another 60 to fill vacancies. Keeping the posts filled is difficult. Not only do the appointments require top-notch senior NCOs, they also last for only three years, meaning there is constant turnover.


Throughout its history, the US Army relied on the concept of the first sergeant, which was a formal rank. The Air Service, Air Corps, and Army Air Forces, all of which were integral parts of the Army, also embraced the concept. When the Air Force became a separate service in 1947, however, it broke with Army tradition and made the position a duty specialty. In 1954, Gen. Nathan F. Twining, the USAF Chief of Staff, approved the use of the diamond in the V above the grade insignia as the first sergeant device.

Twists and Turns
In the late 1950s, the responsibilities of the first sergeant were reduced. The unit first sergeant became essentially an orderly room manager. In the same period, the Air Force created the E-8 and E-9 grades, further complicating the role of the first sergeant.

Superintendents in these grades routinely overruled the first sergeant’s directions to airmen in junior grades. Numerous problems with the position prompted a study of the procedures for selecting and using first sergeants.

In 1961 the Air Force created the separate first sergeant career field (01090) and ruled that males in grades E-7 and above and females in E-6 and above could hold the post.

In 1967, Strategic Air Command’s 15th Air Force opened at March AFB, Calif., what is thought to be the Air Force’s original first sergeant school. Training included advanced management, personnel counseling, communications, and military justice.

In the early 1970s, the Air Force made a top-down effort to improve the first sergeant selection, training, and image. A headquarters workshop recommended formal training courses and in 1972, the Air Force Extension Course Institute developed a first sergeant career development course. A year later, the Air Force issued AFR 39-16, “Selection, Training, and Utilization of First Sergeants.”


In 2003, the Air Force again changed course, turning the first sergeant job once more into a separate special duty assignment. At the same time, it adopted the “three plus three” policy making the tour three years, with the possibility of a three-year extension. The reason for making the job a special duty was largely a matter of perception, said Miller.

“The stigma used to be that when you became a first sergeant, you stayed a first sergeant,” she said. “You never could go back or, if you went back, it was negative.”

Another factor in the decision to make the job a special duty was the hard fact that it had lost its appeal to many airmen. The Air Force was seriously short of first sergeant applicants. The changes made the post more attractive to senior NCOs and improved recruiting.

Since 1973, new first shirts require training not only at the Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy but also at the First Sergeant Academy. There is little duplication in their curricula. At the FSA, security forces procedures, human resources intervention, and counseling skills are all covered in more depth than at the Senior NCO Academy.

Among enlisted troops, there is support for returning the first sergeant job to a career Air Force Specialty Code. The fact that so many command chiefs and Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force have served as first sergeants seems to bolster the argument for returning it to career status.

On the other hand, some first sergeants like the idea of making the status a rank, as in the Army. Past confusion over whether the first sergeant or the ranking NCO on a base was in charge of enlisted members lends some support to this thinking.

http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2008/January%202008/0108shirts.aspx

[reddog]

I have no illusions of my being a great leader and was just an Platoon Sergeant in a line company during a busy, dangerous time in Vietnam. The hardest part of my job was not crossing that very thin line and becoming too friendly or being just 'one of the guys'. It just went against my 'grain' because I'm a friendly sort. Perhaps the higher one goes the lonelier it gets, but you can't remain in control if you cross that line. We had a new Platoon Leader that made the mistake of being one of the guys and you wouldn't believe the problems that caused. I didn't envy my Company Commander's job and thought it was probably the loneliest job on the planet. He was a 'special breed', tough as nails, but highly regarded. Great posts, any thoughts on crossing that 'line'?
Easy Brother,
Reddog...

[wukong]

I am by far not an expert on the inner working and hidden mechanisms of an Infantry unit, but there are some parallels in the aviation world. Aviations units fail when they can no longer maintain an operation ready status. Although not all ways the case but predominately the reasons are people related. A unit that is operational ready has aircraft ready to fly at a certain ratio of aircraft assigned. A certain number of ready crews that are fully trained and physically fit for duty. A certain amount of supplies in WRSK kits immediately available to deploy with the aircraft and numerous other measures of combat readiness. When these measurable factors fall below what is deemed adequate, the Commander's attention is focused in these areas. A fall in the number of operational ready aircraft could very well indicate problems in maintenance manning, morale or a host of other problems. Whether it is "leadership" or "management" that is the cause of the problem, the commander has to deal with the cause.

In the example of Easy Company at "The Breaking Point," the company only had one effective officer, Lt Compton. It was the Sergeant Guarneres', Malarkys', and Martins' as well as First Sergeant Lipton that kept Easy Company as a stable and functioning fighting force. I would not deem Compton as a failed leader, he nor anyone else is a iron man. Compton had only so much to give emotionally. Compton was very close to his men and paid a price for that bond.

What this boils down to is that units fail where the work is done. It fails due to specific actions or non action by the privates, seamen or airmen that do the bulk of the work. The line supervision by sergeants or petty officers is absolutely critical. All command basically does is facilitate that work.

The article that soccermark23 posted was very informative on the specific duties of the First Sergeant. The explicit duty is to be the commander's people expert. I would also contend that implicit in those duties is a requirement to treat the units officers including the commander as a body that the First Sergeant is also responsible. These are bodies that must be sheltered, fed, clothed and armed. In the Air Force the focus of the First Sergeant or Senior Enlisted Advisor is not on the mission, but on the people assigned to the mission. This assignment allows Command to focus more on the mission with dedicated assistance in protecting the commanders people. This arrangement also provides quicker command response to the needs of the human element.

It is difficult to argue a rational case opposed to this management style. US combat forces are much more flexible, ready and deadly than what I experienced in 1971.

[Billyd]

What this boils down to is that units fail where the work is done. It fails due to specific actions or non action by the privates, seamen or airmen that do the bulk of the work. The line supervision by sergeants or petty officers is absolutely critical. All command basically does is facilitate that work.


Not entirely true. The command enviroment will have great impact on how the sergeants and petty officers press the jr. enlisted folks to perform their tasks.

Live example: I had just arrived at my unit and one of the appointments was to attent the commander's inbrief. I was one of about 15 or so Sergeants in the room when the commander tells us "You are not real NCOs." Now, what kind of enviroment did that tell us we were going to be working in? Do you think we were motivated to mission excellence? At my next assignment, we had a commander that right before 20AF came in to do our NSTI, was walking the hallways of the building, greeting every person by name, shaking his/her hand and jokingly telling us he was with the IG and was here to help us. What do you suppose the impact on mission excellence was? We scored very well and morale was VERY high and it showed. We took the IG and showed them how missile comm was supposed to be done.

[wukong]

Not entirely true. The command enviroment will have great impact on how the sergeants and petty officers press the jr. enlisted folks to perform their tasks.

Live example: I had just arrived at my unit and one of the appointments was to attent the commander's inbrief. I was one of about 15 or so Sergeants in the room when the commander tells us "You are not real NCOs." Now, what kind of enviroment did that tell us we were going to be working in? Do you think we were motivated to mission excellence?

I have no idea of the intent of the statement and will agree it was not a positive motivation. I will assume that you and your fellow NCOs did not let down on your tasks and performed your supervisory duties regardless of the real or perceived poor leadership. Aside from the poor motivation, did command support you in the performance of your duties? Did your unit fail to perform it's mission?

[Javelin66]

I've always been interested in the AF concept of the 'First Shirt' being a career field.

Generally, the 1SG is the senior enlisted man in the company. In addition to filling the 'First Shirt' role described in the article, he is the 'standard bearer' for Soldier skills, mentors the platoon sergeants, works with the XO to keep the logistics flowing, and is the company commander's right hand man.

Our First Sergeants are developed by holding team, squad/section, and platoon sergeant jobs over the years, and are then selected locally by the senior NCOs (BN/BDE CSMs).

[Billyd]

Aside from the poor motivation, did command support you in the performance of your duties? Did your unit fail to perform it's mission?

No, to the first. And while we did perform our mission, we were less than enthusiastic about it. No sense of urgency, and just the minimum to get by. The attitude displayed by this commander towards Jr NCOs and the airman permeated the unit to the point that the SNCOs could do little to raise morale.

[wukong]

No, to the first. And while we did perform our mission, we were less than enthusiastic about it. No sense of urgency, and just the minimum to get by. The attitude displayed by this commander towards Jr NCOs and the airman permeated the unit to the point that the SNCOs could do little to raise morale.

How did your problem within the unit resolve itself? How long did it take a higher level to respond?

[Billyd]

How did your problem within the unit resolve itself? How long did it take a higher level to respond?


This wasn't just my problem, there were a number of us that experienced this treatment. Unfortunately, it didn't get resolved while I was assigned. This situation occurred while on a remote assignment and the commander and I left within a couple of weeks of each other. As to a higher level of command responding, we didn't have an ORI or similar inspection while I was there. While I used this extreme example, I had at least three other commanders that would not be considered leaders as well. While my example is truly not the norm, I used it only to refute your statement that "all command basically does is facilitate that work." If the command has no respect for the NCOs and jr enlisted that are doing the work, why should they put forth thier best effort?

If you look at the second half of my example, the majority of the commanders that I served with were similar to him in that they tried to inspire troops to achieve their potential. They provided the tools, leadership and mentoring to help us succeed. Mutual respect was the program and they sought the counsel of not only the SNCOs, but of the Mid-Tier NCOs as well. They listened to our concerns and tried to earn our respect as much as we tried to earn thiers.

[JohnP]

I can give you two examples of leadership for line troops.

The unit was functioning well and able to meet the requirements established by the Air Force and in fact had completed the first overt combat action since the Viet Nam war with high success and a wonderful reputation as being the men to call when the balloon went up.

A change of command ensued and the new commander at his opening address told the men that we were doing great and foresaw no need to change anything and to keep up the good work. He authorized unit parties and attended them with his wonderful wife. The young troops loved him and even called his wife “Mom” whenever she dropped in. He was a fast-burner and was using the unit to get his star and was pulled quickly from the unit to do a stint at the Pentagon and eventually earned his star.

This commander was succeeded by a very rough, no-BS type of ex-fighter jock that flew prop fighters (A-1E) in Viet-Nam in support of Air Rescue. At his opening address, he stated that his goal was not to let us sit on our laurels and continue with the norm. He stated that he was going to challenge us to exceed our goals progress into the unit of the 22nd century. (This was in the mid ‘80s. The year 2001 seemed like a dream.)
There was a lot of grumbling among the wrong troops who had gotten used to sliding by on the minimums and were now asked to earn their pay. There were less unit parties and more unit training. All NCOs rose to the challenge and began planning and implementing changes to improve training and standards.

A year later, the unit was hailed as the best TACP unit in the Tactical Air Command. At the end of year briefing, what did this old colonel state? “You’ve done well; the only thing I can promise you for next year is more hard work. Set your goals higher and strive to surpass them. A mans grasp should only be exceeded by his reach.” The unit became the best in the Air Force and is still striving to improve.

He stayed there for 2 more years before he was forced to retire. His leadership is what set the standard for the whole unit. This is the type of leadership that initially causes some hesitation, but eventually, with the support of the other officers and NCOs will raise a units moral and standards of conduct.

[wukong]

I used it only to refute your statement that "all command basically does is facilitate that work." If the command has no respect for the NCOs and jr enlisted that are doing the work, why should they put forth thier best effort?


Sorry, poor wording on my part. My purpose was to infer that command is there to facilitate that work. Just as my intent was not perfectly relayed thru the choice of words, your commander may have had good intentions and expressed them in the wrong way. Some of us just have that knack of saying the wrong thing at the right time.:D

[Billyd]

Sorry, poor wording on my part. My purpose was to infer that command is there to facilitate that work. Just as my intent was not perfectly relayed thru the choice of words, your commander may have had good intentions and expressed them in the wrong way. Some of us just have that knack of saying the wrong thing at the right time.:D

That was the way I read your statement. And when the commander and his staff perform that function, all is well. However, when the commander fails, as I intended my example to show, it does effect how the unit performs. This commander meant what he said about us not being real NCOs and refused to talk to us.

[wukong]

There has been a great deal of exasperation in the previous iterations of this thread as to the inability of some who are incapable of differentiating clear differences between obvious examples of officers who are leaders as opposed to managers. Often these clear examples will become less clear if examined from a different perspective.

One of the most frustrating events that happens in crisis management (as in war) is the need to "cannibalize" parts to meet mission needs. From the perspective of the airman mechanic that is working 12 plus hours at night at Utapao AB where the aircraft are still 100 degrees plus and the humidity is 98 percent or greater; it looks like needless work just to keep a certain number of aircraft flying. The question arises as to why the officer "idiots" in charge don't order up the required parts on a reasonable schedule. Parts do break so why not keep them in stock. If answers are needed we can discuss "push" as oppose to "pull" demand for resupply.

At the other end of the problem is an engaged soldier at a Dak To or Khe Sanh that is looking for air delivered ordnance or resupply for survival.

No commander at the unit level should wish to see his men jerked around. This is true for higher levels of command. Most often the requirement to do additional work because of your "bean counting" unit commander is driven by a decision by higher levels of command where a "leader" may have to weigh the the lives and welfare of others against the "stupid" dog work by others at a seemingly remote setting for reason your "bean counter" does not know or understand. I did not see this or understand this paradox as a junior officer. It is easy to rage against the "bean counting" manager in ignorant bliss. You will see it play out if you get the opportunity to "count the beans" at higher levels of command and especially in joint assignments.

My intent is not to say that an officer has no control over whether he appears to his men as a leader or a manager. What I do want to say is that how he is perceived by others not subject to his stewardship is colored by outside factors not readily seen by his subordinates.

[Billyd]

Noted and understood. While we at the NCO level do not always know what pressures are being brought to bear on the commander, one would hope that a Major up for LC would understand what it takes to be a leader vice a manager. I expect the Jr Officer to be more of a manager until he gains experience leading small groups. He will gain those skills by observing Sr Officers and SNCOs and emulating them.

Sometimes these individuals seem to function in a vacuum and don't realize that what they say and do has an impact, positive or negative, on their troops and those that operate in said vacuum give the impression that they don't care. And like it or not, what the airman perceives, right or wrong, is what he believes. Perception, especially among younger troops, is reality.

If the commander informs the troops of the necessity, to use your example of the grunt on the ground awaiting bullets, beans and bandages, to work those hours to get the plane in the air, they will have a better sense of mission accomplishment when that aircraft takes off to deliver said bullets, beans and bandages.

Not to say all "bean counters" are that way, but most of the manager types typically are. There is nothing wrong with counting beans despite what some would have you believe. We have limited resources and need to make sure that we stretch them as far as we can.

As to cannibalization of aircraft or other equipment, as a maintenance type, I know that in order to K-bal that part, you better have the replacement on order and get permission from the CHOM.

[wukong]

When you are in the trenches, you hardly ever get to see what is happening in the next trench over. I've watched a broken bird at Utapao become essentially the supply depot for keeping some 14 other C-130s flying. By the time the spares need to get the ramp queen operational arrived in stock, other parts fail due to not being flown. Missions for aircraft are cut at the AF Component level of a JTF or Unified Command. The wing, group or Det possessing the planes often do not know where they are going. For Example a C-130 with a bed down at Utapao would launch a plane to Bien Hoa with a load of lettuce and stationary. At Bein Hoa it might be the plane reloaded with 5.56, claymores or barbed wire for Dak To. All the folks busting their ass to get the plane off from Utapao will see for their efforts is the delivery of lettuce and paper weights to Bein Hoa.

You are right that when troops know how critical their efforts are makes a supreme difference. There is perception and there is reality and quite often perception is reality. That does not excuse poor leadership at the trench level. However from what you described, the individual commander appears be both a poor leader and poor manager which I believe is most often the case. Outstanding management can often cover for poor leadership skill.

[HairyEyeball]

Outstanding management can often cover for poor leadership skill.

Perhaps, from a management standpoint. It's been my experience that the opposite is true: Outstanding leadership can cover a multitude of poor management sins. Once again, what one sees is dependent on where one sits.

Having been in the position, at consecutive times, of repairing, manning, and depending on the timely arrival of helicopters for insertion, supply and medevac, and having been fortunate enough to serve with some outstanding 'leaders' and a few competent 'managers', I've formed (surprise!) some fairly strong opinions. Among them are the initial statement of this post.

Insofar as the sky is already falling (and 'global warming' is apparently responsible for the opening of ski resorts in Hell), I agree with Wu: When the 'snuffies' out at the sharp end of the 'support' stick are made aware of the ultimate results of their labors - the aircraft they send off with - what was it, Wu, 'feminine hygeine products'? from Boredom AFB to NAS Ennui - may not have elicited their wholehearted effort, but let them know where else it went (those 'beans, bullets, boots and bandages' to Khe Sanh, perhaps?), and it's a whole new ballgame. A 'leader' understands this, a 'manager' may not.

Unit 'parties' in and of themselves are neutral - when and why they're thrown isn't. When an 'op' that required a minimum of 25 hours 'on', 8 'off' concluded and our CO ordered the 24-hour stand down and squadron party, we knew we were being 'rewarded' for earning a little more than just our paychecks. The perception was reinforced when we noticed who was 'partying' and who 'pulled the duty'.

Leadership skills and management skills are not mutually exclusive, nor should they be, but what large organizations - and the military certainly qualifies - and certainly those which embrace the 'up-or-out' principle of the military establishment sometimes cannot control is the 'square peg in the round hole'. There is a need for 'bean counters', and certainly those beans need to be counted - and accounted for - but 'getting your ticket punched' for promotion mitigates against that sort of specialization.

[soccermark23]

I think my favorite is when higher ups micro-manage the crap out of you instead of just assigning you a task and letting you finish. Here's my example:

We had a hard broke jet over in the desert back in 2006. Myself and another member were tasked with troubleshooting. Throughout the course of fixing this jet, we had Chiefs and Officers, along with Pro-Super, bugging us about the jet ever 45 minutes or so. Finally enough was enough and we had to tell them to get the heck away from us or the darn jet was never going to be fixed. I understand that they want updates on the status of certain projects, but here's the deal; as maintainers we know that you have a need for updates on the status of a jet. We will update you when there is something to be updated. As Top can attest to, many of our weapons checks take quite a bit of time and patience; and one thing that makes it even more difficult is having the leadership constantly poking their noses in your back.

[wukong]

Insofar as the sky is already falling (and 'global warming' is apparently responsible for the opening of ski resorts in Hell), I agree with Wu: When the 'snuffies' out at the sharp end of the 'support' stick are made aware of the ultimate results of their labors - the aircraft they send off with - what was it, Wu, 'feminine hygeine products'? from Boredom AFB to NAS Ennui - may not have elicited their wholehearted effort, but let them know where else it went (those 'beans, bullets, boots and bandages' to Khe Sanh, perhaps?), and it's a whole new ballgame. A 'leader' understands this, a 'manager' may not.

You have a good point, perhaps a "leader" should say something to this effect whether he knows for sure it's the truth. On the otherhand too much stretching of the truth and you lose credibility.

An example of where outstanding management skills can overcome less than sterling leadership skills is the command of a base or facility, especially the megabases such as Kadena, Hickam or MCB Butler. Whether or not you would follow the base commander into hell or even know his name, the fact that the toilets have paper, the showers hot water, and the chow hall has edible food is supremely important. Let these areas go lacking and even Audie Murphy gets fired. One could even say the same for the staff functions (S/G1, S/G2, S/G3, etc.). These intensively management functions allow the Commander to be the one everyone else follows into the breach of hell as they know some unknown manager is organizing and cleaning up after the parade.

OTOH, I have never known of a AF or Marine base commander who had not before assignment demonstrated good leadership skills.

[HairyEyeball]

Precisely. When 'managers' are assigned to primarily 'management' positions, as Ian Fleming wrote Felix Leiter saying: "Nothing propinks like propinquity". It is part of the system, though, that exemplary 'leaders' are promoted to 'management' positions, in great part because of their successes as 'leaders', and not all have the temperament to be primarily 'managers'. Unlike the civilian world, the military cannot create a 'vice-presidency' out of thin air, or pay a leader increasingly higher compensation while keeping him in the position where he is most valuable/successful.

Additionally, as mentioned in the earlier iteration of the thread, a 'wartime' military is desperate for 'leaders' who inspire troops and win victories. Such individuals, and their peculiar talents, rarely transition well to a 'peacetime' military; they either leave of their own accord or are forced out, and when the next 'shooting war' comes along, command at all levels has gone to 'managers' whose units pass inspections and have every mess tray and spare tire accounted for, but may not have the tools for 'leadership'.

As bad as it was for the world in general, the period between World Wars had the benefit, such as it was, of providing 'banana republic' wars in which many Marine Corps leaders of WW II and Korea learned, and honed, their 'leadership' skills: Contrast the difference between initial actions - on Guadalcanal, Marines were led by officers and NCOs with that experience; at Kasserine Pass, the Army was led by officers and NCOs who were versed only in theory. We took the 'Canal. We got our butts handed to us in North Africa.

[wukong]

Hairy you have captured in part an inarguable essence of a paradox. The inability to identify early those individuals who have the "right stuff" to provide "leadership" in future combat actions. Every military disaster whether it be Pearl Harbor, Bataan, or Abu Gharib can be attributed to poor or failed leadership. It is the nature of the beast and incumbent on the person who has command at those points in history. What is wrong is to taint all officers except those who rise to the occasion as a result of those disasters as incompetent idiots or failed "bean counters." Do we have failed officers in the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps? Yes. Are they the majority? The answer I would submit is to look at the success of Desert Storm, OIF, Panama, Grenada and the combat capability inherent in our forces today.

I believe that history shows that Nimitz declined to accept the post Kimmel was assigned at Pearl Harbor as his intuition led him to believe that it was the wrong post to be in at that moment. We will never know what Nimitz would have done had he taken that assignment. We do know what happened to Kimmel. If true should we fault Nimitz on leadership for the disaster at Pearl?

When I look at the charges made against Pappas for actions at Abu Gharib, I see a list of management failures. Merely to suggest that he was responsible and stop the buck there would leave us with a case much like Colonel Davenport. Not only was Davenport relieved, but Lt Zimmerman was also taken out of the equation. General Savage made the unit functional by holding those who failed responsible by assignment to the "Leper Colony." I would bet that if we could review Colonel Pappas' personnel file we would find evidence of a competent combat leader as a more junior officer in rank or responsibility.

You are spot on with respect to the Marine Corps experience in the period between the great wars. This experience was critical in the Marines' performance at the NCO level and especially so at Bataan and Corregidor by the "China Marines." Airlift is one of the few aspects of military organization where the wartime functions are exactly the same as the peacetime functions. I believe that the combat elements of both the Army and Marine Corps count on this capability and plan for it to be right when they need to call on it.

[wukong]

So far we have discussed the officer as a leader opposed to a manager thereby inferring that the "manager" was somehow a negative from a military view. I would like to add this to the discussion to view the officer as a manager in the success of the military mission.

Lt. General William Tunner although a leader is the quintessential officer as a manager. General Tunner was responsible for recognizing and bringing statistical analysis and quality control to the fore front of sustained military air operations. Without this exhaustive "bean counting" the Hump and Berlin Airlift could not have happened.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/hoppebj.pdf

An equally critical member of the staff would be his Bengal
wing commander, a wing whose only mission was to fly the Hump.
Tunner picked an old acquaintance, Colonel Andrew Cannon. Cannon
had a reputation for being loyal to his troops to the point that
they would do almost anything for him. This was just the sort of
commander he needed to foster a professional and competent flying
corps. He followed this up with the selection of Captain Kenneth
Stiles, a "number cruncher" who had devised new methods to track
aircraft deliveries in Tunner's Ferrying Command. Stiles would
devise a statistical system to track everything from aircraft
maintenance and discrepancies to accident statistics required for
the new safety programs created by his flying safety officer,
Captain Arthur Norden.

Another would be General Schreiver.

http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/baschriever.htm

During his career, he recognized the significance of the intellectual capacity of his staff and said that same mental prowess would be needed to usher the United States into the space age. He once wrote that it was "a national disgrace the term 'egghead' as synonym for intellectual excellence has become a derogatory expression."

"Let me tell you that it is the 'eggheads' who are saving us -- just as it was the 'eggheads' who wrote the Constitution of the United States. It is the 'eggheads' in the realm of science and technology, in industry, in statecraft, as well as in other fields who form the first line of freedom's defense."

[Javelin66]

Establishing and enforcing high standards and leadership are not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, those standards don't always make sense to the entire command (what a lot would call 'chicken$#!+ rules). Remember that one of Patton's more famous rules was that officers would wear neckties in combat.

As far as Kasserine Pass, I don't know if that was a sign of poor leadership (although there was plenty of that), or more an indicator that we had the wrong force using the wrong tactics and equipment against an experienced, highly trained, well equipped, and superbly led enemy. This was the Army's first taste of true maneuver warfare, and we were not prepated for it at all.

[wukong]

A Janitor's 10 Lessons in Leadership
By Col. James Moschgat, 12th Operations Group Commander, graduate USAFA class of 1977
William "Bill" Crawford certainly was an unimpressive figure, one you could easily overlook during a hectic day at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Mr. Crawford, as most of us referred to him back in the late 1970s, was our squadron janitor. While we cadets busied ourselves preparing for academic exams, athletic events, Saturday morning parades and room inspections, or never-ending leadership classes, Bill quietly m oved about the squadron mopping and buffing floors, emptying trash cans, cleaning toilets, or just tidying up the mess 100 college-age kids can leave in a dormitory. Sadly, and for many years, few of us gave him much notice, rendering little more than a passing nod or throwing a curt, "G'morning!" in his direction as we hurried off to our daily duties. Why? Perhaps it was because of the way he did his job-he always kept the squadron area spotlessly clean, even the toilets and showers gleamed. Frankly, he did his job so well, none of us had to notice or get involved. After all, cleaning toilets was his job, not ours. Maybe it was his physical appearance that made him disappear into the background. Bill didn't move very quickly and, in fact, you could say he even shuffled a bit, as if he suffered from some sort of injury. His gray hair and wrinkled face made him appear ancient to a group of young cadets. And his crooked smile, well, it looked a little funny. Face it, Bill was an old man working in a young person's world. What did he have to offer us on a personal level? Finally, maybe it was Mr. Crawford's personality that rendered him almost invisible to the young people around him. Bill was shy, almost painfully so. He seldom spoke to a cadet unless they addressed him first, and that didn't happen very often. Our janitor always buried himself in his work, moving about with stooped shoulders, a quiet gait, and an averted gaze. If he noticed the hustle and bustle of cadet life aroun d him, it was hard to tell. So, for whatever reason, Bill blended into the woodwork and became just another fixture around the squadron. The Academy, one of our nation's premier leadership laboratories, kept us busy from dawn till dusk. And Mr. Crawford...well, he was just a janitor.



That changed one fall Saturday afternoon in 1976. I was reading a book about World War II and the tough Allied ground campaign in Italy, when I stumbled across an incredible story. On Sept. 13, 1943, a Private William Crawford from Colorado, assigned to the 36th Infantry Division, had been involved in some bloody fighting on Hill 424 near Altavilla, Italy. The words on the page leapt out at me: "in the face of intense and overwhelming hostile fire ... with no regard for personal safety ... on his own initiative, Private Crawford single-handedly attacked fortified enemy positions." It continued, "for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at risk of life above and beyond the call of duty, the President of the United States ..." "Holy cow," I said to my roommate, "you're not going to believe this, but I think our janitor is a Medal of Honor winner." We all knew Mr. Crawford was a WWII Army vet, but that didn't keep my friend from looking at me as if I was some sort of alien being. Nonetheless, we couldn't wait to ask Bill about the story on Monday. We met Mr. Crawford bright and ea rly Monday and showed him the page in question from the book, anticipation and doubt on our faces. He starred at it for a few silent moments and then quietly uttered something like, "Yep, that's me." Mouths agape, my roommate and I looked at one another, then at the book, and quickly back at our janitor. Almost at once we both stuttered, "Why didn't you ever tell us about it?" He slowly replied after some thought, "That was one day in my life and it happened a long time ago." I guess we were all at a loss for words after that. We had to hurry off to class and Bill, well, he had chores to attend to. However, after that brief exchange, things were never again the same around our squadron. Word spread like wildfire among the cadets that we had a hero in our midst-Mr. Crawford, our janitor, had won the Medal! Cadets who had once passed by Bill with hardly a glance, now greeted him with a smile and a respectful, "Good morning, Mr. Crawford."
Those who had before left a mess for the "janitor" to clean up started taking it upon themselves to put things in order. Most cadets routinely stopped to talk to Bill throughout the day and we even began inviting him to our formal squadron functions. He'd show up dressed in a conservative dark suit and quietly talk to those who approached him, the only sign of his heroics being a simple blue, star-spangled lapel pin. Almost overnight, Bill went from being a simple fixture in our squadron to one of our teammates. Mr. Crawford changed too, but you had to look closely to notice the difference. After that fall day in 1976, he seemed to move with more purpose, his shoulders didn't seem to be as stooped, he met our greetings with a direct gaze and a stronger "good morning" in return, and he flashed his crooked smile more often. The squadron gleamed as always, but everyone now seemed to notice it more. Bill even got to know most of us by our first names, something that didn't happen often at the Academy. While no one ever formally acknowledged the change, I think we became Bill's cadets and his squadron. As often happens in life, events sweep us away from those in our past. The last time I saw Bill was on graduation day in June 1977. As I walked out of the squadron for the last time, he shook my hand and simply said, "Good luck, young man." With that, I embarked on a career that has been truly lucky and blessed. Mr. Crawford continued to work at the Academy and eventually retired in his native Colorado where he resides today, one of four Medal of Honor winners living in a small town. A wise person once said, "It's not life that's important, but those you meet along the way that make the difference." Bill was one who made a difference for me. While I haven't seen Mr. Crawford in over twenty years, he'd probably be surprised to know I think of him often. Bill Crawford, our janitor, taught me many valuable, unforgettable leadership lessons. Here are ten I'd like to share with you.
Be Cautious of Labels. Labels you place on people may define your relationship to them and bound their potential. Sadly, and for a long time, we labeled Bill as just a janitor, but he was so much more. Therefore, be cautious of a leader who callously says, "Hey, he's just an Airman." Likewise, don't tolerate the O-1, who says, "I can't do that, I'm just a lieutenant."

Everyone Deserves Respect. Because we hung the "janitor" label on Mr. Crawford, we often wrongly treated him with less respect than others around us. He deserved much more, and not just because he was a Medal of Honor winner. Bill deserved respect because he was a janitor, walked among us, and was a part of our team.

Courtesy Makes a Difference. Be courteous to all around you, regardless of rank or position. Military customs, as well as common courtesies, help bond a team. When our daily words to Mr. Crawford turned from perfunctory "hellos" to heartfelt greetings, his demeanor and personality outwardly changed. It made a difference for all of us.

Take Time to Know Your People. Life in the military is hectic, but that's no excuse for not knowing the people you work for and with. For years a hero walked among us at the Academy and we never knew it. Who are the heroes that walk in your midst?

Anyone Can Be a Hero. Mr. Crawford certainly didn't fit anyone's standard definition of a hero. Moreover, he was just a private on the day he won his Medal. Don't sell your people short, for any one of them may be the hero who rises to the occasion when duty calls. On the other hand, it's easy to turn to your proven performers when the chips are down, but don't ignore the rest of the team. Today's rookie could and should be tomorrow's superstar.

Leaders Should Be Humble. Most modern day heroes and some leaders are anything but humble, especially if you calibrate your "hero meter" on today's athletic fields. End zone celebrations and self-aggrandizement are what we've come to expect from sports greats. Not Mr. Crawford-he was too busy working to celebrate his past heroics. Leaders would be well-served to do the same.

Life Won't Always Hand You What You Think You Deserve. We in the military work hard and, dang it, we deserve recognition, right? However, sometimes you just have to persevere, even when accolades don't come your way. Perhaps you weren't nominated for junior officer or airman of the quarter as you thought you should - don't let that stop you.

Don't pursue glory; pursue excellence. Private Bill Crawford didn't pursue glory; he did his duty and then swept floors for a living. No Job is Beneath a Leader. If Bill Crawford, a Medal of Honor winner, could clean latrines and smile, is there a job beneath your dignity? Think about it.

Pursue Excellence. No matter what task life hands you, do it well. Dr. Martin Luther King said, "If life makes you a street sweeper, be the best street sweeper you can be." Mr. Crawford modeled that philosophy and helped make our dormitory area a home.

[wukong]

Life is a Leadership Laboratory. All too often we look to some school or PME class to teach us about leadership when, in fact, life is a leadership laboratory. Those you meet everyday will teach you enduring lessons if you just take time to stop, look and listen. I spent four years at the Air Force Academy, took dozens of classes, read hundreds of books, and met thousands of great people. I gleaned leadership skills from all of them, but one of the people I remember most is Mr. Bill Crawford and the lessons he unknowingly taught. Don't miss your opportunity to learn. Bill Crawford was a janitor. However, he was also a teacher, friend, role model and one great American hero. Thanks, Mr. Crawford, for some valuable leadership lessons.

And now, for the rest of the story.........

Pvt William John Crawford was a platoon scout for 3rd Platoon of Company L 142nd Regiment 36th Division (Texas National Guard) and won the Medal Of Honor for his actions on Hill 424, just 4 days after the invasion at Salerno. You can read his citation at www.army.mil/cmh-pg/mohiia1.htm.

On Hill 424, Pvt Crawford took out 3 enemy machine guns before darkness fell, halting the platoon's advance. Pvt Crawford could not be found and was assumed dead. The request for his MOH was quickly approved. MG Terry Allen presented the posthumous MOH to Bill Crawford's father, George, on 11 May 1944 in Camp (now Fort) Carson, near Pueblo. Nearly two months after that, it was learned that Pvt Crawford was alive in a POW camp in Germany. During his captivity, a German guard clubbed him with his rifle. Bill overpowered him, took the rifle away, and beat the guard unconscious. A German doctor's testimony saved him from severe punishment, perhaps death. To stay ahead of the advancing Russian army, the prisoners were marched 500 miles in 52 days in the middle of the German winter, subsisting on one potato a day. An allied tank column liberated the camp in the spring of 1945, and Pvt Crawford took his first hot shower in 18 months on VE Day. Pvt Crawford stayed in the army before retiring as a MSG and becoming a janitor. In 1984, President Ronald Reagan officially presented the Medal Of Honor to Bill Crawford

[reddog]

Without question, the best story I've read today and befitting of this thread.
Thank you for posting, Sir.
Easy Brother,
Reddog...